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The Space Shuttle Challenger and Columbia accidents resulted in tragic loss of life and 
national assets, and investigations into both accidents produced important lessons to prevent 
future accidents. 
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"Those who cannot rem.ember the 
past are condemned to repeat it." 
George Santayana, , 
9:rle Life of Reason Vol. 1, 1905 
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NASA's Legacy Prior to Challenger 
• Mercury 
• 1 st American in 
Space 
st American in 
~arth Orbit 
~ 
• 6 ml'SsfG~s 
• 34 h~[S longest 
missiort\du~ation 
l 
Challenger and Columbia Lessons 
Learned 
Agenda 
• Legacy of NASA Prior to Challenger 
• Challenger Accident 
• Challenger Findings 
~NASA Response to Challenger 
~'@tumbia Accident 
• cci1" mbia Findings 
The Fut ,re 
r 
NASA's Legacy Prior to Challenger 
• Gemini 
• Two crew members in 
sp.ace for up. to 2-
weeks 
NASA's Legacy Prior to Challenger 
• Apollo 
• Lunar landing and 
return to Earth . 
• 11 crewed 
miSSions 
.2 earth orbit 
- lunar orbit ~~~\.SWingbY :~ ',; "~:.J.i,,,: 
-6 ~ar1andings 
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NASA's Legacy Prior to Challenger 
• Skylab 
• 1 st US space station 
• 3 crew members 
• 3 missions, 29, 59, 
and 84 days 
• Experimental and 
servational platform 
----- ~--- ------
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NASA's Legacy Prior to Challenger 
• Apollo-Soyuz 
• 1 st international 
. manned spaceflight 
• Test rendezvous and 
docking system 
compatibility 
~--.Qpening for future 
A,ned spaceflights 
L 
The Challenger Accident 
• Challenger mission 51 L. launched January 28, 
1986 
• 25th Space Shuttle Mission 
• Challer~ger was lost 73 seconds into its flight 
• 7 crew members were killed, the vehicle lost 
• A Presidential Commission was appointed to 
• Review circumstances surrounding the accident to 
es~blish the probable cause or causes of the 
CCI13ent; and 
• D~~~Iecommendations for corrective or other acu'6>~ basKd upon the Commission's findings and 
determ-inatrons. 
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Challenger Commission Findings 
• The cause of the Challenger 
accident was the failure of the 
pressure seal in the aft field joint of 
the right Solid Rocket Motor. 
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Challenger Commission Findings 
• Faulty design unacceptably sensitive to a 
number of factors 
• Factors were effects of temperature, 
physical dimensions, the character of 
materials, the effects of reusability, 
~ll '@)cessing, and the reaction of the joint to 
Y'Q~ rrl 'i-Q loading 
1 
Challenger Commission 
Contributing Cause Findings 
• Deci!sion making process seriously flawed 
leading up to launch of Challenger 
• Waiving of launch constraints appeared to be 
at expense of flight safety and was not 
reviewed by all levels of management 
• Marshall management appears to hold 
~t~ntially serious problems internally 
/ -----, 
Challenger Commission 
Contributing Cause Findings 
• Rockwell recommendation regarding ice-
on-the-pad was ambiguous 
• NASA's response did not indicate 
appropriate consideration of Rockwell's 
~input ~~ze protection on the pad was ina{je~ate 
~\ 
Challenger Commission Findings 
Accident Rooted in History 
• SRM joint test and certification program 
inadequate 
• Neither NASA nor Thiokol understood join 
sealing mechanisms 
~ NASA and Thiokol accepted escalating ~~,ecause they" got away with it last 
t ·,~ " Ime 
---~~~~~~ 
Challenger Commission Findings 
Accident Rooted in History 
• Tracking of anomalies for Flight Readiness 
Reviews failed in not identifying joint seal 
failures on previous flights 
• O-ring failure history presented to NASA 
Level II August 1985 was sufficient to 
~~uire corrective action before next flight 
~'car-eful flight history analysis would have 
reve~I'ed~he correlation of O-ring damage 
with I~ temperatures 
Challenger Commission Findings 
Silent Safety Program 
• Reductions in Marshall safety, reliability, and 
quality assurance work force limited capability in 
those functions 
• Organization structures at Kennedy and 
Marshall place safety, reliability, and quality 
assurance offices under the offices whose 
C~,i~S they are to check 
• Pml)l~m~porting requirements are not concise 
and fuil\to 6.ommunicate to proper management 
---_. 
Challenger Commission Findings 
Silent Safety Program 
• Little or no trend analysis on O-ring 
problems 
• As fliglht rate increased, safety, reliability, 
and quality assurance workforce at 
~arshall was decreasing, adversely 
---~ff~cting safety 
• F~~kS after the Challenger accident, 
the 't).i~C~jty of the SRM field joint was not properl~~umented in the Marshall 
problem r~pd(ting system 
-- ----
~j 
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Challenger Commission Findings 
Pressures on the System 
• Shuttle flight processing and training 
systenl capabilities were stretched to limit 
due to flight rate 
• Spare parts were in critically short supply 
~~en flights occur in rapid succession, no 
--- s.y~€m in place to ensur~ anomalies are aCiQr~ed before next flight 
[ 
l _ _ 
Challenger Commission 
Recommendations 
I. Redesign SRB with Independent Oversight 
II. Place more authority with Program 
Management 
Assign Astronauts to Management 
Establish a Shuttle Safety Panel 
~iew critical items and hazards analysis 
~~ablish an Office of Safety Reliability and 
Q'bI.ality~ssurance at Headquarters 
-~----
.,,--- -- -
Challenger Commission 
Recom mendations (conti n ued) 
v. Improve Communications 
I. Constraints 
II. FRR records and attendees 
VI. Landing Safety 
:::::::---V~j Launch Abort and Crew Escape ~~vide a crew escape system for gliding 
light 
--> ~-- -_._-' 
I 
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NASA Response to Challenger 
• Redesigned SRM with Independent 
Oversight of Design Activities 
• Reorganized Shuttle Management to 
Report to Headquarters 
::::::::--. Appointed Astronauts to Management 
Soa~ ight) ~ 
• Esta11nshed Shuttle Safety Panel 
r-- -
The Columbia Accident 
• Columbia's mission STS-107 launched on 
January 16, 2003 
• 113th Space Shuttle Mission 
• Columbia was lost during atmospheric reentry 
February 1 , 2003 
• 7 crew members were killed 
• NASA Administrator ApPointed Investigation 
eam 
"eTh~ine the facts, as well as the actual or p~?DI-e causes of the Shuttle mishap in terms of 
domi~n~nd contributing root causes and signif~~t observations and, recommend , prevent~ a'n~,_ other appropriate actions to 
preclude recu,,\ence of a similar mishap. 
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Columbia Accident Investigation 
Board Findings 
"The physical cause of the loss of Columbia and its 
crew was a breach in the Thermal Protection 
System on the leading edge of the left wing." 
" .. the management practices overseeing the 
~pace Shuttle Program were as much a cause 
-.J~~ ~CCident as the foam that struck the left 
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Columbia Findings 
Technical 
• NASA does not fully understand External Tank 
(ET) foam loss mechanisms 
• 80% of 79 missions with imagery have had ET 
foam loss 
~-E!einforced Carbon-Carbon (RCC) not required 
~"'Ili\ave impact resistance 
• 1~~aiQn techniques inadequate for RCC 
• Two f~m''CIoseout processes on ET able to be 
perform~ ti}( one-person 
-- _. ----------------
--------, 
I 
- _._---- ._----
CAIS Findings 
Technical 
• Photographic evidence indicated foam projectile 
impacted leading edge of left wing in area of 
RGG panels 6 through 9 
• Data on foam was adequate to determine its 
~e~t on both thermal tiles and RGG 
~ ~Jumbia entered atmosphere with preexisting 
b~"h~in~eft wing 
• NAS~ebrl'S impact analysis tools inadequate 
I 
L. 
NASA Response to Columbia 
Technical 
• SRB bolt catcher certification done by 
analysis 
• Quality assurance on bolt catchers not 
adequate to assure product acceptability 
~ '-~-J'ji5lffi"(wn metal object seen separating 
frdm'Sl\uttle during SRB separation on 6 
. - _ ... --- . 
, 
CAIS Findings 
Organization 
• By Columbia, many institutional practices 
in place at Challenger had returned 
• Silent Safety Program 
• Acceptance of deviations from expected 
~erformance 
.~~~ule pressure 
• SP~)'~lht Operations Contract 
- ---._--" - --- - --
CAIS Findings 
Organization 
• Shuttle budget reduced 40% over last 
decade 
• Shuttle workforce reduced by 42% 
between 1993 and 2002 
- ---, 
. I 
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CAIS Findings 
Organization 
• NASA did not follow its rules on foam 
shedding 
• Foam shedding evolved from serious 
safety concern to in-family or no safety of 
-i1gh, risk or accepted risk 
• L~ i~edback among projects on in-
flight aJ\lornalies 
.--- - ---. . --- - -------
CAIS Findings 
Organization 
• Resolution of STS-112 foam loss in-flight 
not due' until after Columbia mission 
• No trend analysis performed on foam loss 
~--~ASA headquarters focus on ISS 
BRedules 
sche \ ~~e 
,--
CAIS Findings 
Organization 
• NASA safety system historically deficient 
• Administrator for SR&QA not responsible 
for execution but instead policy 
~ Little progress in integrated Shuttle 
~ ~h"~ards analysis 
• ~t:J~~ystems Integration office handles 
all s)stems except Orbiter 
• Less~ ~rned are not part of process 
CAIS Findings 
Decision Making 
• Foam strike identified during photo review on 
flight day 2 larger than any seen. before 
• Outside imagery of Orbiter for damage 
assessment requested by Chair of photo 
~ working group on flight day 2 ~ team model used outside calibrated ~~~aDase 
'--.--~--~= 
• unc~t~intJes in analysis not communicated to 
mana~'m~t 
~d 
briefings 
-----
CAIS Findings 
Leadership 
• Management not engaged in foam 
analysis 
• Management had belief that foam strike 
not a safety of flight issue 
~.::M-@Qagement required engineers to prove 
'1 ,~~bri~strike was unsafe instead of safe 
• Ma~gement did not challenge 
" \ .:~ preSentBtlolns 
CAIS Recommendations 
29 Recommendations 
• Eliminate ET foam shedding 
• Toughen Orbiter TPS 
• Improve inspection of Ree 
~~eIOP on-orbit inspection and repair of 
l:P,S'and Ree 
• DeVe':l~alidated analysis models for 
debris as~ssment 
L__ _ _ _ "
.- ------ - -----
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CAIS Recommendations 
• Provide sensors on Orbiter for vehicle 
health and monitoring 
• Develop wiring inspection techniques 
• Require at least 2-ernployees attend all ET 
~oam closeouts 
---..-.neveJpp flight schedule that is resource 
,.~ 
drftte{l 
CAIS Recommendations 
• Conduct mission management team 
training 
• Establish independent technical authority 
responsible for requirements and waivers 
~. Establish Safety and Mission Assurance 
'"' ''th-Jine authority over program 
accur-a y~ith closeout photos 
- -- .. _ -- -.-
NASA's Response to CAIS 
• NASA is addressing technical and organizational 
causes of accidents 
• Formed NASA Engineering and Safety Center for 
technical oversight of programs 
• NASA Implementation Plan for Space Shuttle 
Return to Flight and Beyond 
-'-6~ddressing all CAIB recommendations and 
Qi)s'ervations 
• Reti)fJ'l.~Flight Oversight Committee 
• AddresS'j~~~ ltural issues through management 
structura~ha\es, assessment, and training 
l_ 
Challenger and Columbia Common 
Lessons Learned 
• Provide continual, independent, program 
oversight and program review functions that 
emphasize safety. 
• Ensure quality program and safety management 
that have clear definition of authority and 
responsibility and have resources 
~ommensurate with requirements . 
• ~i7t~ comprehensive and effective program 
p'r~s~ and system~ that support the safety 
rIsk ma1Jag'ement functIon . 
' . 
Challenger and Columbia Common 
Lessons Learned 
• Maintain realistic plans that have 
provisions for flexibility, minimize outside 
pressures and stress flight and ground 
safety . 
• Control effectively the development of 
~ r~ti?al items with respect to performance 
efJ l1(Onments, tolerances, . margins, 
"' . I m~fa«tunng processes, testIng and 
safet·, 
Challenger and Columbia Common 
Lessons Learned 
• Ensure quality performance of work force 
involved in safety critical operations 
including adherence to required 
procedures and constraints. 
• Provide cultural climate conducive to ~l(eSSiOn of differing opinions and open 
Ci1£J..iQ 
._- -_ .. _-
l 
I 
. I 
,-. ......-----"---
The Future 
• Vision for Space Exploration issued by President Bush 
January 14, 2004 
• Fly Shuttle until 2010 
• Complete Space Station Assembly 
• Focus Station research on space exploration goals 
• Begin robotic missions to rllOOn by 2008, human 
~ions to moon by 2020 
~~olilt~ e Mars robotic exploration 
• ~Quct~uman missions to Mars after capability exists 
• De~~ ~Iew Exploration Vehicle to support explorat~.n 
"This cause of exploration and 
discovery is not an option we choose; it 
is a desire written in the human heart" 
President George W. Bush 
. CAIS Recommendations 
• Conduct mission management team 
training 
• Establish independent technical authority 
responsible for requirements and waivers 
~~tablish Safety and Mission Assurance 
""lth-Jine authority over program 
• UP'cl~draWingS and verify configuration 
accuracy~ith closeout photos 
- ---- - ------
. 1 
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NASA's Response to CAIB 
• NASA is addressing technical and organizational 
causes of accidents 
• Formed NASA Engineering and Safety Center for 
technical oversight of programs · 1 
• NASA Implementation Plan for Space Shuttle 
Return to Flight and Beyond 
-~~ddressing all CAIB recommendations and 
Qi)s'ervations 
• RetufJ'l,~Flight Oversight Committee 
• AddreSg'j'~~~ltural issues through management 
structural~haKlges , assessment, and training 
------- -------~ 
Challenger and Columbia Common 
Lessons Learned 
• Provide continual, independent, program 
oversight and program review functions that 
emphasize safety. 
• Ensure quality program and safety management 
that have clear definition of authority and 
responsibility and have resources 
~mmensurate with requirements . 
• """'I~?ttai...n comprehensive and effective program 
p.ro~s'e~ and system~ that support the safety 
rIsk m~{1ag,ement functIon. 
Challenger and Columbia Common 
Lessons Learned 
• Maintain realistic plans that have 
provisions for flexibility, minimize outside 
. pressures and stress flight and ground 
safety" 
• Control effectively the development of 
ritical items with respect to performance 
if.Q!1ments, tolerances, margins, 
mCJ.Q...vfa,C(/uring processes, testing and 
safet~ 
~" ~---, 
Challenger and Columbia Common 
Lessons Learned 
• Ensure quality performance of work force 
involved in safety critical operations 
including adherence to required 
procedures and constraints . 
• Provide cultural climate conducive to ~(eSSiOn of differing opinions and open 
Cil&l'IO 
---- ---- --- -
---- ~-.--- -- -- ----
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The Future 
• Vision for Space Exploration issued by President Bush 
January 14, 2004 
• Fly Shuttle until 2010 
• Complete Space Station Assembly 
• Focus Station research on space exploration goals 
• Begin robotic missions to moon by 2008, human 
~ions to moon by 2020 
"--- . GOPltiQue Mars robotic exploration 
• l~uCt--numan missions to Mars after capability exists 
• Dev81~ ~{ew Exploration Vehicle to support explorat~.n 
r 
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I 
L 
-----.----~-------
"This cause of exploration and 
discovery is not an option we choose; it 
is a desire written in the human heart" 
President George W. Bush 
---····l 
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